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Abstract. Sequent-type proof systems constitute an important and widely-used
class of calculi well-suited for analysing proof search. In my master’s thesis, I in-
troduce sequent-type calculi for a variant of default logic employing Łukasiewicz’s
three-valued logic as the underlying base logic. This version of default logic has
been introduced by Radzikowska addressing some representational shortcomings
of standard default logic. More specifically, the calculi discussed in my thesis
axiomatise brave and skeptical reasoning for this version of default logic, respec-
tively following the sequent method first introduced in the context of nonmono-
tonic reasoning by Bonatti and Olivetti, which employ a complementary calculus
for axiomatising invalid formulas, taking care of expressing the consistency con-
dition of defaults.
1 Background
Nonmonotonic reasoning is a well-established area in knowledge representation and rea-
soning dealing with formalisations of rational arguments whose characteristic feature
is that their conclusions may have to be retracted in the light of new, more specific infor-
mation. Thus, the inference mechanism underlying rational arguments is nonmonotonic
in the sense that an increased set of premisses does not necessarily entail an increased
set of conclusions. This is in contradistinction to valid arguments whose underlying in-
ference process is monotonic. Many different nonmonotonic formalisms have been in-
troduced in the literature, most prominent among them are default logic [39], autoepis-
temic logic [34], circumscription [32], and logic programming under the answer-set
semantics [20,21].
In my thesis, I deal with a variant of default logic, viz. three-valued default logic,
DL3, introduced by Radzikowska [38], where Lukasiewicz’s three-valued logicŁ3 [26]
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is used as underlying logical apparatus. In particular, three-valued default logic allows
for a more fine-grained distinction between formulas obtained by applying defaults and
formulas which are known for certain, in order to avoid counterintuitive conclusions
by successive applications of defaults. Three-valued default logic is one of a variety
of versions of default logic addressing various shortcomings of the original proposal.
Among these different approaches are, e.g., justified default logic [28], disjunctive de-
fault logic [22], constrained default logic [42,13], rational default logic [33], and gen-
eral default logic [52] (an overview about different versions of default logic is given by
Antoniou and Wang [2]).
Similar as in standard default logic [39], a default theory in DL3 is a pair T =
〈W,D〉, whereW is a set of formulas in Łukasiewicz’s three-valued logic Ł3 andD is
a set of defaults which are rules of the form
A : B1, . . . , Bn
C
,
where A,B1, . . . , Bn, C are formulas in Ł3. The intuitive meaning of such a default is:
if A is believed, and B1, . . . , Bn and LC are consistent with what is believed
(i.e., , none of ¬B1, . . . ,¬Bn,¬LC are derivable), thenMC is asserted.
Here, L and M are operators which, according to Łukasiewicz [26], where first for-
malised in 1921 by Tarski by defining LA := ¬(A ⊃ ¬A) and MA := (¬A ⊃ A).
Intuitively, LA expresses that A is certain, whilst MA means that A is possible. With
these operators, one distinguishes between certain knowledge and defeasible conclu-
sions. Note that DL3 differs from the original version of default logic not only by
using Ł3 instead of classical logic as the underlying logical apparatus but also by the
modification of the consistency condition for applying defaults, having the additional
condition that ¬LC must also not be derivable.
Extensions, representing a possible totality of logical consequences on the basis of
a default theory, are defined by means of a fixed-point condition, similar as in standard
default logic, but taking the modified interpretation of defaults and the underlying logic
Ł3 into account. Formally, an extension of a default theory T = 〈W,D〉 in DL3 is
defined thus: For a set S of formulas, let ΓT (S) be the smallest set K of formulas
obeying the following conditions:
(i) K = ThŁ3(K), where ThŁ3(K) is the deductive closure ofK in Ł3, i.e., the set
of all formulas derivable fromK in Ł3;
(ii) W ⊆ K;
(iii) if (A : B1, . . . , Bn/C) ∈ D, A ∈ K , ¬B1 6∈ S, . . . ,¬Bn 6∈ S, and ¬LC /∈ S,
thenMC ∈ K .
Then, E is an extension of T iff ΓT (E) = E.
2 Central Research Questions and Results
In my thesis, I deal with the question of developing a proof theory for the three-valued
default logic DL3 based on the method of sequent-style calculi. In general, sequent-
type proof systems, first introduced in the 1930s by Gerhard Gentzen [23] for classical
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and intuitionistic logic, are among the basic calculi used in automated deduction for
analysing proof search. Specifically, the aim of my thesis is to have systems axioma-
tising brave and skeptical reasoning for DL3. Recall that a formula A is a brave con-
sequence of a default theory T iff A is contained in some extension of T , and A is a
skeptical consequence of T iff it is contained in all extensions of T .
Although Radzikowska [38] gave a resolution-based characterisation of brave rea-
soning for closed normal default theories, generalising the method for standard default
logic as proposed by Reiter [39], strictly speaking, this cannot count as a proper proof
system because an external (meta-theoretical) consistency check has to be performed.
Rather, my thesis follows the approach first introduced by Bonatti [9] who developed
a sequent calculus for propositional default logic, likewise formalising brave reasoning
as in Reiter’s own proposal, but for general default theories and not just normal ones.
Later, Bonatti and Olivetti [10] introduced also a calculus for skeptical reasoning and a
variant calculus for brave reasoning.
In my thesis, the calculi of Bonatti [9] and Bonatti and Olivetti [10] are generalised
to the three-valued default logicDL3 of Radzikowska and soundness and completeness
will be proven. The elements of the brave reasoning calculus following the version of
Bonatti [9] are sequents of the form
Γ ;∆⇒ Σ;Θ,
where Γ , Σ, and Θ are finite sets of propositional formulas and ∆ is a finite set of
propositional defaults. Such a sequent is true iff there is an extension E of the default
theory 〈Γ,∆〉 such thatΣ ⊆ E andΘ ∩E = ∅. Analogously, elements of the skeptical
calculus are sequents of the form
Σ;Γ ;∆⇒ Θ,
whereΣ is a set of formulas referred to as provability constraints,Γ andΘ are finite sets
of propositional formulas, and∆ is a finite set of propositional defaults. Such a sequent
is true iff all extensions of the default theory 〈Γ,∆〉 which satisfy the constraints in Σ,
contain at least one element of Θ.
A distinguishing feature of the calculi of Bonatti [9] and Bonatti and Olivetti [10]
is the usage of a complementary calculus for axiomatising invalid formulas, i.e., of
non-theorems, taking care of formalising the consistency condition of defaults, which
makes these calculi arguably particularly elegant and suitable for proof-complexity elab-
orations as, e.g., recently undertaken by Beyersdorff et al. [6]. In a complementary cal-
culus, the inference rules formalise the propagation of refutability instead of validity
and thus establish invalidity by deduction, i.e., in a purely syntactic manner. Comple-
mentary calculi are also referred to as refutation calculi or rejection calculi and the first
axiomatic treatment of rejection was done by Łukasiewicz in his formalisation of Aris-
totle’s syllogistic [27]. Subsequently, rejection calculi for many different logics have
been introduced, like for intuitionistic logic [43,17,44], modal logics [24,45], many-
valued logics [36,8], and description logics [5], as well as a comprehensive theory of
rejected propositions has been developed [46,49,11,47,48] (a detailed description of the
history of axiomatic rejection is given, e.g., in the excellent survey paper by Urszula
Wybraniec-Skardowska [50]).
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Similar to Bonatti and Olivetti’s approach, our calculi for DL3 consist of three
parts, viz.
(i) a sequent calculus for Łukasiewiz’s three-valued logic Ł3,
(ii) a complementary anti-sequent calculus for Ł3, and
(iii) specific default inference rules.
For many-valued logics, different kinds of sequent-style systems exist in the literature,
like systems [7,4] based on (two-sided) sequents in the style of Gentzen [23] employing
additional non-standard rules, or using hypersequents [3], which are tuples of Gentzen-
style sequents. In our sequent and anti-sequent calculi for Łukasiewicz’s three-valued
logic Ł3, we adopt the approach of Rousseau [41], because it represents a natural gener-
alisation of the classical two-sided sequent formulation of Gentzen to the many-valued
case. In a three-valued setting, a sequent in the sense of Rousseau is a triple of the form
Γ1 | Γ2 | Γ3,
where each Γi (i ∈ {1, 2, 3}) is a finite set of formulas of Ł3 and each component of
such a sequent intuitively corresponds to one of the three truth values in Ł3, viz. Γ1
corresponds to the truth value f (“false”), Γ2 corresponds to u (“undetermined”), and
Γ3 corresponds to t (“true”). More specifically, Γ1 | Γ2 | Γ3 is true under a three-valued
interpretation if, for at least one i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, Γi contains some formula A having truth
value vi, where v1 = f , v2 = u, and v3 = t, otherwise Γ1 | Γ2 | Γ3 is false under the
given interpretation. Correspondingly, an anti-sequent is a triple of the form
Γ1 ∤ Γ2 ∤ Γ3,
where each Γi is as before, with the semantic meaning that Γ1 ∤ Γ2 ∤ Γ3 is refutable iff
Γ1 | Γ2 | Γ3 is false under some three-valued interpretation. Note that a three-valued
interpretation is a mapping which assigns to each atomic formula of Ł3 one of the
three truth values f , u, or t, and this assignment of truth values is extended to arbitrary
formulas by the respective truth conditions for the different logical connectives of Ł3
(for details, cf., e.g., the well-known textbook by Malinowski [30] or the survey paper
by the same author [31]).
The calculi which will be used for three-valued sequents and anti-sequents can be
obtained from a systematic construction of calculi for many-valued logics as described
by Zach [51] and Bogojeski [8].
3 Discussion
The proof-theoretical approach we undertake is flexible and can be applied to formalise
also other versions of default reasoning. Indeed, justified default logic [28], constrained
default logic [42,13], and rational default logic [33] have been axiomatised in the style
of Bonatti [9] by Lupea [29], as well as intuitionistic default logic by Egly and Tom-
pits [18].
Related to the sequent approach discussed in my thesis are works employing tableau
methods. In particular, Niemelä [35] introduces a tableau calculus for inference under
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circumscription. Other tableau approaches, however, do not encode inference directly,
rather they characterisemodels (resp., extensions) associated with a particular nonmono-
tonic reasoning formalism [1,37,12,19].
In view of the close relation of standard default logic with answer-set programming,
an interesting possible topic for future work would be to study a similar relation of
DL3 to a Łukasiewicz-style three-valued semantics of answer-set programs. Note that
the concept of Kleene answer-set programs [15,14,16] have recently been defined, mak-
ing use of the three-valued logic of Kleene [25]. Also, as DL3 allows to distinguish
between certain knowledge and default conclusions, one may envisage a mechanism to
keep track on howmany applications of defaults are required in order to derive a certain
default conclusion, and thus being able to define some kind of degree of trust of a default
conclusion, as done similarly in the approach of Rondogiannis and Troumpoukis [40]
for logic programs under the well-founded semantics.
4 Publications
The calculus for brave reasoning forDL3 generalising Bonatti’s approach [9] from my
thesis have already been published in the proceedings of the 15th International Confer-
ence on Logic Programming and Nonmonotonic Reasoning (LPNMR 2019), while the
prospective results concerning the other calculi are planned to be submitted to a future
conference.
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